Page Content: ​Kenneth Admire was injured in a motor vehicle accident in 1987, leaving him bound to a wheelchair. The driver of the other vehicle was insured by Auto-Owners Insurance Company. Under the no-fault act (MCL 500.3103 et seq.), Auto-Owners became responsible for paying personal protection insurance benefits to Admire.

As a result of his injuries, Admire is unable to get in or out of a standard vehicle, and needs hand controls for accelerations and braking. To accommodate Admire’s special needs, Auto-Owners paid the full cost of three modified vans at seven-year intervals. Under the most recent transportation agreement, in April 2000, Auto-Owners agreed to pay $37,807.76 for a van. In December 2006, Admire’s guardian, Russell Admire, notified Auto-Owners that it was time to purchase a new handicap-accessible van. Auto-Owners responded that it was not obligated to pay for a new van under either the transportation agreement or the no-fault act, but Auto-Owners advised Admire that he could trade in the 2000 van for a new one and that the insurer would cover the cost of “necessary medical modifications.” In February 2007, Russell Admire purchased a new van and received $6,000 for the trade-in of the 2000 van, leaving a balance of $18,388.50, not including modifications. Auto-Owners later paid $19,405.00 for modifications.

Admire sued Auto-Owners, seeking reimbursement of the full cost of the replacement van ($18,388.50) as an allowable expense under MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Under this provision of the no-fault act, no-fault benefits are payable for “all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services, and accommodations for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” Auto-Owners filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), citing Griffith v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 472 Mich 521 (2005), and Weakland v Toledo Engineering Co, 467 Mich 344 (2003), for the proposition that it was not obligated under the no-fault act to pay the base purchase price of the van, but was only required to pay for modifications required because of Admire’s injuries. The trial judge denied Auto-Owners’ motion, ruling that Auto-Owners was obligated under the parties’ 2000 agreement to pay the full purchase price of the new van.

The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. The appellate court did not agree with the trial court that the parties’ 2000 agreement obligated Auto-Owners to purchase a new van; the contract was ambiguous in that regard, the Court of Appeals said. But the Court of Appeals did conclude that the no-fault act imposed such an obligation on Auto-Owners. Admire had established that he could not drive a standard vehicle and needed a modified van for his transportation needs, the Court of Appeals stated. Moreover, Auto-Owners did not show that Admire could use alternative transportation or that the amount requested for reimbursement was unreasonable; accordingly, MCL 500.3107(1)(a) obligated Auto-Owners to purchase a van for Admire, the Court of Appeals concluded. Auto-Owners appeals.

Calendar Number: Oral Argument on Application

Date: 03/07/12

Issue: This auto no-fault case involves a claim for reimbursement of the full cost of a handicap-accessible van for a person who was catastrophically injured in an automobile accident. The trial judge granted summary disposition in the plaintiff’s favor, finding that the defendant insurance company was obligated under a contract between the parties to pay the full purchase price of a new van (as opposed to paying for only those modifications required to enable the injured person to use the van). The Court of Appeals affirmed. The insurance company appeals, arguing that it is not required under the no-fault act to pay the full purchase price for the new van. The plaintiff filed a cross-appeal, arguing that the insurance company is obligated under both the no-fault act and the contract to pay the full cost of a new van. Whether, or to what extent, is the defendant obligated to pay the plaintiff personal protection insurance benefits under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., for handicap-accessible transportation?

Attorney Information: ​

Kenneth Admire,		George T. Sinas
	Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
v	(Appeal from Ct of Appeals
	(Ingham – Brown, T.)
Auto-Owners Insurance Company,		Kimberlee A. Hillock
	Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Briefs Information: ​Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Response to Application for Leave to Appeal and Cross
Application for Leave to Appeal>>
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross Appellant's Supplemental Brief>>

Defendant-Appellant's Application for Leave to Appeal>>
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee's Reply Brief>>
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee's Response to Cross-Application for Leave to Cross-Appeal>>
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee's Supplemental Brief>>

Michigan Insurance Coalition's Amicus Curiae Brief>>

Coalition Protecting Auto No-Fault's (CPAN) Amicus Curiae Brief>>

Order Link: 142842 Order.pdf

Status: Not Started

Opinions Link: 142842 Opinion.pdf

Page Content: ​In 2011, the Legislature passed 2011 PA 4, the local government and school district fiscal accountability act (MCL 14.1501 et seq.), which provides for management and control of local governments’ finances in financial emergencies. PA 4 replaced 1990 PA 72, the Local Government Fiscal Responsibility Act (MCL 141.1201 et seq.). PA 4 granted broader powers to emergency managers than PA 72 did.

It is clear from the record evidence that plaintiff’s petition heading is printed in Calibri, the current default family in Microsoft software. It is further undisputed that the font was categorized by the Microsoft software as “14-point.” However, as conceded by the printers and by plaintiff in this case, the actual size of text varies depending on the font family chosen. In other words, “14-point” Calibri font measures in a different type size than “14-point” Arial font. Therefore, text in a so-called 14-point font may not necessarily meet the 14-point type standard of 14/72 inches. Because a heading of 14-point type is plainly and unambiguously prescribed by the Secretary and MCL 168.482(2), text that does not measure 14 point, or 14/72 inches, is insufficient under the statute. Here, the Calibri font utilized in plaintiff’s petition heading is smaller than the prescribed 14-point type measurement of 14/72 inches. In fact, the heading on plaintiff’s petition only measures 12 point on an E-scale ruler. Thus, plaintiff’s petition contains a fatal formatting defect, and the petitions are invalid under the Secretary’s prescribed format and § 482.

 

The Bloomfield Court’s conclusion that initiating petitions need not “exactly match the Michigan Election Law requirements for form and content” ignored the Legislature’s use of the term “shall,” a clear expression of its intent that the form of an initiating petition be in a specified type, and constituted an improper failure to recognize and defer to a legislative mandate …. In the instant case, the expression of legislative intent is even clearer. As we earlier mentioned, the Legislature amended § 482(2) in 1965 by striking the language permitting the petition heading to be in “type of the approximate size set forth” and replaced it with the mandatory language, “shall be . . . in 14-point boldfaced type.” The inescapable conclusion to be derived from this amendment is that the Legislature no longer wished to permit heading type of an indefinite size, but instead intended to require the heading to be a uniform, standardized dimension – that of 14-point type, or 14/72 inches …. Thus, but for MCR 7.215(J)(1), which requires us to follow the holding in Bloomfield, we would conclude that the petition heading is fatally defective, that plaintiff has no clear legal right to certification of the referendum for placement on the November 2012 ballot, and that the Board is mandated to reject the petitions as invalid.

 

Date: 07/25/12

Issue: The plaintiff seeks to have a referendum placed on the ballot to overturn the state’s emergency financial manager law, 2011 PA 4. Did the plaintiff’s petitions comply with a statutory requirement for the petition heading to be in 14-point type? If the heading petition is smaller than 14-point type, does the petition nevertheless “substantially comply” with the statute, and if so, must the measure then be certified for the ballot? Was Bloomfield Charter Township v Oakland County Clerk, 253 Mich App 1 (2002) – the Court of Appeals decision which states that “substantial compliance” with statutory referenda requirements is sufficient – wrongly decided?

Attorney Information: ​

Stand Up For Democracy,		Herbert Sanders
	Plaintiff-Appellee,
v	(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
Board of State Canvassers, Ruth Johnson, Secretary of State,		Heather Meingast
	Defendants,
and
Citizens for Fiscal Responsibility,		John Pirich
	Intervening Defendant-Appellant.

Briefs Information:

​Intervening Appellant's Application for Leave to Appeal>>

Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief in Opposition>>
Defendant Appellee Sec'y of State's Brief in Opposition>>

Intervening Appellant's Reply in Support of Application>>

Plaintiff-Appellee's Supplemental Brief>> 
Defendant Appellee Sec'y of State's Supplemental Brief>>
Attorney General's Supplemental Brief>>
Intervening Defendant-Appellant's Supplemental Brief>>
American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan's Amicus Curiae Brief>>

Status: Draft

Opinions Link: 145387-Opinion.pdf

Page Content:

Judge Sylvia A. James, a judge of the 22nd District Court in Inkster since 1988, was placed on administrative leave on April 13, 2011 by the Michigan Supreme Court, following a State Court Administrative Office audit of the court's community service program fund. On October 26, 2011, the Judicial Tenure Commission filed a formal complaint that charged the judge with four counts of judicial misconduct, alleging that the judge:

•Engaged in financial improprieties. The JTC alleged that the judge used money from a community service program for travel expenses, to benefit organizations that were not related to the program, to pay for advertising that promoted the judge, and to benefit her niece, a co-director of the community service program, even after her niece resigned from that position. The JTC also claimed that the judge caused the court's bank accounts to be switched to a different bank when Inkster city officials tried to view the accounts. The JTC claims that these actions amount to embezzlement and obtaining money by false pretenses.

•Violated employment rules for courts by hiring, and giving pay raises to, her niece. The JTC also claims that the judge improperly appointed a magistrate who was not a registered elector in the city of Inkster, and who signed, in error, over 15,000 bench warrants, which later had to be re-issued by a judge.
•Committed administrative improprieties, including imposing an unreasonable dress code.
•Was untruthful in her responses to the JTC, including her denial that that she received any benefit from the community service program disbursements.

On December 15, 2011, the Michigan Supreme Court suspended the judge from office with pay, pending the outcome of the JTC proceeding. After a seven-week hearing, a special master appointed by the Supreme Court concluded that the judge did misappropriate community service program funds, using the program as her "publicly funded private foundation." The master found, among other things, that the judge had assessed excessive oversight fees against defendants as part of their sentences and improperly applied those fees to the community service program first, instead of allocating them as required by state law. The master also determined that the judge had violated the Supreme Court's anti-nepotism employment policy and that she improperly required a magistrate to sign bench warrants. With regard to Count III, the master found that the JTC did not prove most of the allegations, but did find that the judge imposed an unreasonable dress code. As to Count IV, the master concluded that the judge made several misrepresentations during the hearing, including her testimony that she was not put on notice that she needed to have a budget prepared for the community service program account.

The JTC agreed with the master's findings. The JTC asks the Supreme Court to remove the judge from office, and to order her to pay over $81,000 for the costs of the hearing.

The judge responds that she did not take any court funds for her personal benefit, but instead used the community service program fund to benefit the community. There is no evidence that the judge knowingly misallocated funds or violated auditing standards, the judge asserts; moreover, the master did not find that any funds were missing or unaccounted for, the judge notes. As to the employment improprieties claim, the judge asserts that she employed her niece in the good-faith belief that her niece was grandfathered in and not subject to the anti-nepotism policy. As to Count III, the judge states that her court dress code was consistent with judicial ethics rules, and that any problems arose from overzealous enforcement of the dress code by court employees. The judge also maintains that she did not make any misrepresentations, either in her answer to the JTC complaint or during the hearing before the master. The JTC complaint was prompted by political conflicts between her and the mayor of Inkster, not by any real problems with her conduct, the judge claims. She asserts that, at the most, the Supreme Court should only give her a private reprimand; she acted in good faith, did not violate any rule or law, and did not do anything to undermine the administration of justice, the judge states. Removal from office is unwarranted, especially when she has already been suspended from service since April 2011, the judge adds.

Date: 07/31/12

Issue: Did the Judicial Tenure Commissioner properly find that Judge Sylvia A. James committed judicial misconduct, including misuse of funds from a community service program? Should the Supreme Court remove the judge from office, as the JTC recommends? Is the JTC entitled to recover the costs of the proceedings?

Attorney Information: ​

In re: Honorable Sylvia A. James,			Mayer Morganroth
Judge, 22nd District Court			Sharon McPhail
Judicial Tenure Commission			Paul J. Fischer

Briefs Information: ​

Status: Not Started

Opinions Link: 143942-Opinion.pdf

Page Content:

​On September 9, 2009, Terry Nunley was pulled over by police for failing to properly secure the load on his truck; he was later charged with driving with a suspended license, second offense. The elements of that crime are (1) that a defendant’s license has been suspended, and (2) that he was notified of the first suspension as required by law. To establish these elements, the prosecutor obtained a copy of Nunley’s certified driving record from the Michigan Department of State. That record included a “Certificate of Mailing of Orders and Rest[ricted] Lic[ense],” stating:

 

06/11/2009 CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OF ORDERS AND REST LICS (PRG/DR/2485)
MIC. NO X1627 FOR MDR RUN NO. 162 DATED 06/11/2009 PAGE 11

 

I CERTIFY THAT I AM EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER AND THAT ON THIS DATE NOTICE OF THE ORIGINAL ORDER OF SUSPENSION OR RESTRICTED LICENSE WAS GIVEN TO EACH OF THE PERSONS NAMED BELOW BY FIRST-CLASS UNITED STATES MAIL AT LANSING, MICHIGAN AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 212 OF MICHIGAN VEHICLE CODE (MCL 257.212).
DATE 6-22-09 [handwritten] OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE F. Bueter [typewritten]

 

Calendar Number: 5

Date: 04/04/12

Issue: The defendant was charged with driving with a suspended license (second offense), a violation of MCL 257.904(1). An element of that offense is that the offender was notified of the first suspension as required by the statute. The prosecutor sought to introduce into evidence a Department of State certificate of mailing, which states that the defendant was notified by first-class mail the first time that his license was suspended. The district court held that the certificate could not be admitted into evidence unless the person who prepared it appeared at trial to testify. Both the circuit court and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. Did the Court of Appeals err when it held that the Department of State certificate of mailing is testimonial in nature and thus that its admission, without accompanying witness testimony, would violate the Confrontation Clause?

Display Order: 5

Attorney Information: ​

The People of the State of Michigan,		Mark Kneisel
	Plaintiff-Appellee,
v	(Appeal from Ct of Appeals
	(Washtenaw – Morris, M.)
Terry Nunley,		James E.R. Fifelski
	Defendant-Appellee,
and
Attorney General,	Intervenor.

Briefs Information: ​Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief on Appeal>>
Plaintiff-Appellant's Reply Brief>>

Defendant-Appellee's Brief on Appeal>>

Intervenor's Brief on Appeal>>
Intervenor's Reply Brief>>

Prosecuting Attorneys Associations of Michigan's Amicus Curiae Brief>>

Status: Not Started

Opinions Link: 144036-Opinion.pdf

Page Content: In 2004, Penny Jo Johnson, a pedestrian, was hit by a pickup truck driven by John Recca. At the time, Johnson lived with her ex-mother-in-law, Harrietta Johnson. According to Johnson, she suffered serious injuries to her brain and spine, making it necessary for her ex-mother-in-law to help her with personal care and take over household chores. Neither woman owned a vehicle; Recca had a no-fault insurance policy with Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company.

Johnson sued Allstate and Recca. In her first-party claim against Allstate, Johnson alleged that Allstate had failed to pay personal protection insurance benefits, including expenses for attendant care and replacement services that, Johnson claimed, her ex-mother-in-law had provided for three years. Under the no-fault act, replacement services recoverable from an insurer are limited to three years from the date of the accident. In the third-party claim against Recca, Johnson claimed that she had suffered a serious impairment of body function and that Recca is liable to pay for replacement services that Harrietta provided more than three years after the date of the accident. The third-party claim against Recca is at stake in this appeal.

While the no-fault act abolished most tort liability for drivers, an injured person may recover certain limited damages from a negligent driver. MCL 500.3135 provides, for example, that a negligent driver may be liable to pay damages for noneconomic loss where the injured person died, suffered permanent serious disfigurement, or sustained a serious impairment of body function. MCL 500.3135(c) permits “[d]amages for allowable expenses, work loss, and survivor’s loss as defined in [MCL 500.3107 to MCL 500.3110] in excess of the daily, monthly, and 3-year limitations contained in those sections.” MCL 500.3107(1)(a) defines “allowable expenses” as those “consisting of all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and accommodation for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.” Replacement services expenses are covered in MCL 500.3107(1)(c).

The trial court dismissed Johnson’s claims against Recca, holding that expenses for replacement services are not recoverable “allowable expenses” under MCL 500.3135(3)(c); the court reasoned that “allowable expenses” is defined in MCL 500.3107(1)(a), while expenses for replacement services are covered in a separate subsection, MCL 500.3107(1)(c). But in a published opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed. The panel explained, “Because replacement services are services for the ‘care’ of an injured person, we conclude that replacement services expenses are not separate and distinct from ‘allowable expenses’; rather, they are merely one category of ‘allowable expenses.’ ” Recca appeals.

Page Title: Test Oral Argument

Calendar Number: 1

Date: 04/04/12

Issue: After she was injured in a car accident, the plaintiff sued the defendant driver and his insurance company. Among other things, she sought to be compensated for replacement services – household services that someone performs for an injured person when her injuries prevent her from caring for herself. The trial court held that the plaintiff could not recover replacement services from the defendant driver, because replacement services are not “allowable expenses” under MCL 500.3135(3)(c). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that replacement services are a subset of “allowable expenses.” Does MCL 500.3135(3)(c), which permits an injured person to recover excess damages for allowable expenses, work loss, and survivor’s loss

Briefs Information:

Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief on Appeal>>
Defendant-Appellant's Brief on Appeal>>
Insurance Institute of Michigan's Amicus Curiae Brief>>

Opinions Link: 143088-Opinion.pdf

Page Content: ​In this dental malpractice case, plaintiff Rodney Hanna alleges that his dentist, Dr. Dario Merlos, D.D.S., improperly diagnosed and treated Hanna’s teeth in June 2006. On November 8, 2006, Hanna wrote Dr. Merlos a seven-page letter that outlined Hanna’s claims of “poor diagnosis and treatment.” At the end of the letter, Hanna summarized his injuries and stated that he expected Merlos to “take care of [his] dental expenses” and to pay him an additional $7,000, for a total of “$9,829.00 if paid immediately.” Hanna’s attorney sent a second letter to Merlos later that month. Hanna filed his lawsuit on December 13, 2007. There is no evidence that Hanna filed an affidavit of merit with his complaint, despite the requirement of MCL 600.2912d(1) that a “plaintiff in an action alleging medical malpractice . . . shall file with the complaint an affidavit of merit” signed by an expert.

Merlos filed a motion for summary disposition, asking the trial court to dismiss the case, but the trial court denied the motion, accepting Hanna’s assertion that he had filed an affidavit of merit. Merlos filed two more motions for summary disposition, arguing that the court file contained no evidence that an affidavit of merit had ever been filed. Moreover, Merlos contended, Hanna’s notice of intent did not satisfy the requirements listed in MCL 600.2912b. The trial court acknowledged that it did not appear that an affidavit of merit was filed with the complaint, but characterized the omission as a “minor kind of technicality,” and refused to dismiss the lawsuit. As for the notice of intent, the trial court noted that there was no required format, and concluded that Hanna’s first letter to Merlos covered the elements required by MCL 600.2912b, although in a “barely adequate” way.

The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s rulings in an unpublished per curiam opinion. The panel noted that Hanna submitted his affidavit of merit as an exhibit to a brief that he filed in the trial court, which “serendipitously” satisfied the requirement of MCL 600.2912d, because the affidavit of merit was filed before the statute of limitations expired. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the trial court that Hanna’s November 8, 2006 letter qualified as a notice of intent under MCL 600.2912b(4). Although that letter failed to precisely state the proximate cause of Hanna’s injury, the Court of Appeals explained, the defect should be disregarded in the interests of justice, consistent with the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v Shabahang, 484 Mich 156 (2009), and MCL 600.2301. Merlos appeals.

Calendar Number: Oral Argument on Application

Date: 04/05/12

Issue: After sending his dentist a letter complaining about the dental care that he received, the plaintiff sued the dentist for dental malpractice. The plaintiff apparently obtained an affidavit of merit to support his claim, but failed to file it with his lawsuit. The defendant moved for summary disposition, contending that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the pre-suit notice requirement of MCL 600.2912b, and failed to file an affidavit of merit with the complaint, as required by MCL 600.2912d. The trial court denied summary disposition and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff’s submission of a copy of the affidavit of merit to the trial court, as an exhibit to a brief, satisfied MCL 600.2912d, since it was filed before the statute of limitations expired. The panel also held that the plaintiff’s letter qualified as a notice of intent under MCL 600.2912b(4) and that, although that letter failed to precisely state the proximate cause of the alleged injury, the defect should be disregarded in the interests of justice. See Bush v Shabahang, 484 Mich 156 (2009), and MCL 600.2301. Did the Court of Appeals correctly resolve this case?

Attorney Information: ​

Rodney Hanna,		Richard D. Schenkel
	Plaintiff-Appellee,
v	(Appeal from Ct of Appeals
	(Wayne – Drain, G.)
Dario Merlos, D.D.S.,		Noreen L. Slank
	Defendant-Appellant.

Briefs Information: ​Plaintiff-Appellee's Response to Application for Leave to Appeal>>
Plaintiff-Appellee's Response to Supplemental Brief>>

Defendant-Appellant's Application for Leave to Appeal>>
Defendant-Appellant's Reply Brief>>
Defendant-Appellant's Supplemental Brief>>

Michigan State Medical Society's Amicus Curiae Brief>>

Order Link: 142914 Order.pdf

Status: Not Started

Page Content: ​Arnold Mortimore’s wife died; the couple had been married for 53 years. Helen Fiser, whose husband had died about five months earlier, helped with the funeral and was soon involved in every aspect of Mortimore’s life; she managed his finances, paid his bills, and essentially ran his car repair business. Fiser suggested that he prepare a new will, and wanted him to add her name on deeds to his property. She assisted him in revoking a recently created trust, and contacted a notary public to attest to the documents.

When Mortimore died on June 12, 2009, a neighbor called his daughter, Renee Hanneman, and told Hanneman that Fiser was moving everything out of Mortimore’s house. Hanneman called the police, who agreed to investigate, but said that it appeared to be a civil matter and advised Hanneman to contact an attorney. When approached by a police officer, Fiser said that she had been living with Mortimore and that the address on her driver’s license was not her place of residence. She produced a marriage certificate for the officer, but it had not been filed; Fiser filed it six days after Arnold died. The minister who allegedly performed the ceremony could not be found.

Hanneman was informed that her father had executed a new will naming Fiser as the sole beneficiary of his estate. The day after Fiser filed the marriage certificate, Hanneman filed a petition for appointment of a special personal representative. She disputed whether Mortimore was legally married to Fiser, and she challenged the validity of the will, asserting that Fiser was disposing of her father’s property improperly. Hanneman requested that she be appointed personal representative to secure and preserve the estate’s assets. Hanneman and her brother, Dean Mortimore, argued that Fiser exercised undue influence over their father. Fiser responded, asking that the will be declared valid, and that she be appointed personal representative. The judge appointed an interim representative to conserve the assets of the estate pending the outcome of a trial.

Following a three-day trial, the judge validated the will and appointed Fiser as personal representative of the estate, concluding that Mortimore’s children had not proved that Fiser exercised undue influence over their father. The judge explained that his decision was dependent on the witnesses’ credibility; he noted that Mortimore’s doctor felt that he was able to make decisions of his own free will.

Arnold’s children appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court in an unpublished per curiam opinion. Using the three-factor test set forth in In re Karmey Estate, 468 Mich 68 (2003), the Court of Appeals explained that a presumption of undue influence arises when evidence establishes (1) the existence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship between the grantor (the person who makes a will) and a fiduciary; (2) that the fiduciary benefits from a transaction; and (3) that the fiduciary had an opportunity to influence the grantor’s decision in the transaction. In this case, held the Court of Appeals, “the record overwhelmingly supports that Helen [Fiser] was involved in every financial aspect of Arnold’s life and that Arnold trusted Helen to act for his benefit with respect to financial and all other matters.” Moreover, as sole beneficiary, Fiser clearly benefited from Arnold executing the will, and she had the opportunity to influence Arnold’s decision, the appellate court observed. Accordingly, the evidence established a mandatory presumption of undue influence, and the trial court erred in failing to recognize this, the Court of Appeals said. The Court of Appeals also determined, as a matter of law, that Fiser failed to offer sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of undue influence. The presumption therefore “remained unscathed,” and the Court of Appeals held that the will was the product of Fiser’s undue influence. Fiser appeals

Calendar Number: 2

Date: 04/05/12

Issue: This case involves a dispute over the validity of a will and allegations of undue influence. The children of the decedent claimed undue influence by the sole beneficiary, who became an integral part of their father’s life at the time of their mother’s death. The probate court ruled in favor of the beneficiary, and found that the will was not the product of her undue influence. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the probate court failed to recognize a mandatory presumption of undue influence, based on the beneficiary’s fiduciary relationship with the deceased. What standards should apply and what factors should a court consider in determining whether a transaction was the product of undue influence where there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties?

Display Order: 2

Attorney Information: ​

In re Estate of ARNOLD MORTIMORE, Deceased
____________________________
Renee Hanneman and Dean Mortimore,	Appellees,	Douglas G. Chalgian
v	(Appeal from Ct of Appeals
	(Shiawassee Probate – Clatterbaugh, J.)
Helen M. Fiser,		Douglas A. Mielock
	Appellant.

Briefs Information: ​Appellees' Brief on Appeal>>

Appellant's Brief on Appeal>>
Appellant's Reply Brief>>

Order Link: 143307 Order.pdf

Status: Not Started

Page Content: ​Marcy Hill bought a house in Clinton Township. When the sellers of the home moved out, they took their washer and natural gas-powered dryer with them. Although the sellers turned off the gas to the line feeding the dryer, they apparently did not cap the end of the line that attached to the dryer. Neither Hill nor anyone else noticed that the line was uncapped. She lived in the home with her daughter, Patricia, and son Christopher.

Date: 05/09/12

Issue: The plaintiffs’ home exploded after the owner unknowingly turned on the gas to an uncapped gas line and her daughter lit a cigarette lighter. The uncapped gas line was behind an electric dryer that had been installed about three and a half years earlier. The owner, and her children who were living with her, sued the store where the owner bought the dryer, as well as the companies that delivered the dryer and the contractors who installed it. Did the installers owe a duty to the plaintiffs apart from their contractual duty to install the dryer? Did the installers create a new hazard or make an existing hazardous condition worse? Do the other defendants owe any duty to the plaintiffs?

Attorney Information: ​

Marcy Hill, et al,		Mark R. Granzotto
Plaintiff-Appellees,		143329, 143348, and 143633
v                                                                                                       (Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Macomb Circuit -Switalski)
Sears, et al,		Michelle Holwey
Defendants-Appellees,		143329 & 143348
Defendants-Appellants,		143633
and
Excel Direct, et al,		Constantine Kallas
Defendants-Appellants,		143348
Defendants-Appellees,		143329 & 143633
and
Pritchard, et al,		Thomas Azoni
Defendants-Appellants,		143329
Defendants-Appellees,		143348 & 143633
and
Lindsey, et al,
Defendants.

Briefs Information: ​144329, 143348, 14366:
Plaintiffs-Appellees' Supplemental Brief>>

143329
Defendants-Appellants Pritchard and Dameron's Brief in Support of
Application for Leave to Appeal>>
Defendants-Appellants Pritchard and Dameron's Supplemental Brief in Support of
Application for Leave to Appeal>>


143348
Defendants-Appellants Excel Direct/Merchant Delivery's Application for Leave to Appeal>>
Defendants-Appellants Excel Direct/Merchant Delivery's Supplemental Brief in Support
of Application for Leave to Appeal>>
Defendants-Appellants Excel Direct/Merchant Delivery's Supplemental Authority (7/29/11)>>
Defendants-Appellants Excel Direct/Merchant Delivery's Supplemental Authority (8/19/11)>>

143633
Defendants-Appellants Sears, Roebuck and Co., and Sears Logistics Services, Inc.'s
Application for Leave to Appeal>>
Defendants-Appellants Sears, Roebuck and Co., and Sears Logistics Services, Inc.'s
Supplemental Brief in Support of Application for Leave to Appeal>

Status: Not Started

Opinions Link: 143329 143348 143633-Opinion.pdf